POTOMAC AIRFIELD NEWS 10300 Glen Way \* Fort Washington \* MD \* 20744 ADDRESS SERVICE REQUESTED



Regarding FAA's proposed rule to make the ADIZ Permanent...

"The truth shall set you free"

# Dear Secretary Chertoff, ... Or whoever is in charge...

I am the owner of the Potomac Airfield, that small general aviation airfield located *between* Andrews AFB and the White House; and a private pilot approved by the Administration for operation within the most highly protected airspace in the world, the 15 mile FRZ surrounding Washington DC, *and all that implies*...

**BRIEF REVIEW** In reaction to the events of '911,' 25-mile 'temporary flight restrictions' (TFRs) were placed around Boston, New York, and Washington DC, and 25-mile 'Enhanced class B' (ECB) airspace around some thirty other cities across the USA. *This wouldn't have stopped anyone hostile; but the agencies responsible could not tell Friend from Foe anymore, and not knowing what else to do, they did what they knew how to do.* 

Because of the mess, and since no one was willing to admit it was useless, Congress eventually stepped in with Transportation legislation demanding "...all enhanced Class B airspace expire within 90 days, unless specific justification is provided."

Congress knew no justification would be forthcoming; they were using the passage of time to force the forgone conclusion.

...But the Congressional staffers forgot to include the three remaining TFRs!

At the last minute, with some advice, the Committee clarified to DOT "It was the intent of Congress to include the TFRs over Boston and New York to expire..."

This intentionally left one 25 mile TFR around Washington DC. For lack of any other real defenses at the time, and for reasons I will explain momentarily, this actually made some sense at the time.

The next move was to 'buy down' the 25 mile Washington TFR with a 15 mile TFR; 'sacrificing' only three small airports, a fistful of small businesses thereon, and perhaps a thousand people, their assets and their livelihoods, stranded high and dry.

Proving once again how easy it is to sacrifice the liberty of a few, to provide political cover for the many.

The 15 mile radius was based on a wellmeaning falsehood, from one Federal agency to another. As anyone with any knowledge of aircraft speeds and basic arithmetic knows, 15 miles buys nothing; it is a farce. There was still good reason to <u>develop a sustainable contingency</u> <u>paradigm for sterilizing airspace of</u> <u>unknown radar blips</u>, providing means to detect, and time to respond to, any unknown airborne intruders, made <u>sustainable</u> by also permitting all 'known' radar blips, i.e. authorized radar blips, to go about their business normally.

Since that time, a fistful of well-meaning agencies, running in circles, lacking clear objectives or leadership, by pointlessly interfering with the movements of the nation's most legitimate pilots, have inadvertently undermined the program's political, military and security objectives.

But I digress....

## SOMETHING HAPPENED

Post 911 Executive Office Decisions to re-open this last remaining airspace to properly vetted pilots were implemented through FAA's Special Federal Aviation Regulation 94 (SFAR94). Using 40 pages of new regulations and notams, FAA struggled valiantly to <u>publicly specify</u> how to use <u>close-hold</u> military 'identify friend or foe' (IFF) tricks of the trade: "The secret identification code shall be XYZ; and must be used as follows..."

#### Pretty nutty eh? But they meant well.

Adding insult to injury, FAA proceeded to do what *else* it knew how to do, 'administrative enforcement,' *except over the nation's most trusted agents;* for 'compliance with procedures' FAA still didn't understand: "F16 pilots with topsecret or higher clearances SHALL always carry a rubber chicken...Failure to carry a rubber chicken SHALL result in..." Just as FAA was (finally) starting to figure this all out, *then TSA came along. What a headache...* 

ALONG CAME ORANGE During condition 'orange' security agencies expected FAA to stretch the FRZ intruder detection model out to 30+ miles, to provide response time and distance to UNKNOWN airborne movements approaching the city.

...Of course, a hostile pilot using any small aircraft would still remain free to come aloft from anywhere at anytime, <u>even from anywhere within</u> <u>the protected area, not needing any</u> <u>airport at all</u>, just a few hundred feet of flat anything, making the outer 'perimeter' of any airspace boundary entirely meaningless...

It was at that glorious moment in time that TSA grabbed the ball from a stumbling, and most willing to pass FAA. They *fumbled* it, fell on it, and then popped it; simultaneously screwing up what *was* working as planned (The FRZ), while swamping another 30+ miles with needlessly complex airspace having pointless procedures. Thus the ADIZ was born, *and thus it has remained*.

So much for the home team!

## HOW THE ADIZ WORKS

ADIZ PILOT "My name is George Washington, first President of the United States. I would like to file a flightplan; flying my white horse Southbound at around 2PM"

FAA FLIGHT SERVICE "Mr President, your flightplan is filed."

At this stage someone in a dark room somewhere *might* question the airworthiness of the horse, or Mr. Washington's arrest record, *but that's about it; nothing is really known with any confidence about whoever filed the flight plan.*  Misguided DOD policy plants the seeds for further disaster: If 'Mr. Washington's' flightplan predicted his horse to go left, but instead he goes right (such as to get some nice green grass), inter-agency panic will interpret this 'unplanned course deviation' as a threat, and promptly flush the White House and the Capital, *again*...

... and then blame the horse.

Yeah, that makes a lot of sense...

### HOW THE FRZ WORKS

Post 911, the primary objective of airspace security's was basically to <u>deter and detect</u> <u>unauthorized</u> airborne intruders from 'protected' areas; little more than scaring away any harmless pilots inclined to comply, only leaving *remaining* radar blips that were either *Confused* or *Hostile*.

This was *unsustainable* because <u>it forgot to</u> <u>accommodate 'Known Friends;</u>' such as a three star general using his Cessna to get to the Pentagon; or a fighter pilot using his Mooney to get to his F16 at Andrews AFB to fly the CAP, or Joe Regular, to visit his elderly mother in Alexandria. *Whoops!* 

So SFAR 94 essentially modified the inner 15 mile 'no-fly' zone into recognizing known Friend, to allow them to go about their business normally. The security model is/was built on three simple pieces:

**PART 1) All** <u>unauthorized</u> airborne movements (within a certain area) will be blasted to little bits. That's the only measure that stops a bad guy, *the rest is just malarkey*. Airspace was given 'another row of teeth' with air-interdiction; able to head-off the *Confused* before they got into real trouble, and to blast to little bits anyone *Hostile enough* to pick a fight with an F16 or Blackhawk; Finally *surface to air defenses, providing 'flight termination services,' in a pinch.* 

PART 2) <u>Anyone</u> needing access (to the protected area) may apply for authorization (<u>under the arbitrary and capricious auspices of</u>... <u>coordinating with</u>...<u>in consultation with</u>... etc, etc). The objectives of pilot pre-vetting *include* denying access to pilots incapable of navigating their way out of a paper bag; and more importantly, denying access to anyone trained as a terrorist by the Taliban in Afghanistan (ahem).

To this day, FAA continues to check airmen's records for airspace violations, (FAA's own confusion of the airspace in DC has rendered this meaningless), and TSA checks felony history; or if the applicant ever swore at a TSA screener, or what limited information may be shared with them by others.

No matter how hard they look in their empty boxes, they will find nothing. Determined to find something, because otherwise what they do serves no purpose, they can only make something out of nothing: "But his medical has expired..." "He violated airspace, once.." "FAA's records are out of date..." "I see no felony history..."

"But he DID have nail clippers..."

There *is* more to it, but that's where I stop.

**3) Once a pilot is approved, they are given 'special procedures'** which make their radar blips easy to subtract from airborne threat watch <u>reducing workload</u> and making the whole thing <u>sustainable</u>.

We use 'flightplans' which aren't flightplans, and 'air-traffic procedures' which aren't air-traffic procedures, <u>to</u> <u>coordinate security information</u> between other special places. What's so confusing?

The military calls these 'safe passage procedures,' which are how you get your own fighters back to base, past your own air defenses, without shooting them down.

**SO NOW WHAT DO WE DO?** Compliments of AOPA's recent 'public disclosure' of surface to air defenses within Washington DC, "security through obscurity" no longer stands in the way of common-sense reigning triumphant. **One good answer can replace a thousand pointless, misguided questions.** 

<u>THE ONLY QUESTION</u>: What is the *only* effective measure for stopping anyone using any aircraft to over-fly all surface defenses, who is able to come aloft from anywhere at anytime, from getting close enough to attack their target?

THE ONLY ANSWER: Since an attacker *MUST* first come to their target airborne, the only way to stop them is to pre-position point defenses, surface-to-air capabilities, adjacent the target being defended. If the target of interest is unauthorized and comes too close, *KABOOM*! One real defense makes all less effective measures *redundant* and *irrelevant*.

WHERE IS DEFENSE JUSTIFIED? The only reason *anyone* would use an aircraft to attack anything is to access a target that is otherwise inaccessible on the surface: A truck is much easier, much less visible, has far more payload, *and you can even get your deposit back*.

The only place these measures will be implemented is where a successful air attack could interfere with the functioning of the Federal government.

Since a bitter and divisive Congress remains Al Qaeda's best weapon for undermining US foreign policy, *Congress is quite safe.* 

These measures are breathtakingly expensive, at many levels, to government and to the private sector, so your local shopping mall isn't even on the waiting list, *nor will it ever be*. Not only is this good for the White House, *it keeps* shopping far more pleasant for you.

**NEXT STEPS?** Hopefully, it should now be self-evident that there are *smarter* and *easier* ways to achieve these objectives, instead of rubber-stamping the current charade.

<u>Public Safety</u> – With real air defenses downtown, the primary objective of airspace becomes to keep the innocent from coming to harm; requiring <u>only</u> that all pilots nearby the protected area be <u>monitoring</u> airtraffic control, and, *if so inclined*, will follow instructions keeping them from getting blasted to little bits.

<u>Radar Target Coordination</u> - <u>If</u> within a certain area controllers must 'tag' radar targets with a transponder code, to keep straight which radar blips they're talking to and which ones they're not, then issue a squawk, *but impose no needless workload nor complexity, on anyone.* 

<u>If the Orange Balloon Goes Up</u> *They Who Know Who They Are* will need a lot more than a 15 mile FRZ to sterilize *unauthorized* radar blips, to buy sufficient time and distance to intercept the *Confused*; and/or to blast the *Hostile* to little bits.

Instead of codifying the current facade, <u>why not offer a real</u> <u>alternative that allows the current</u> <u>pretense to stand down?</u>

1) Use the FRZ to protect the functioning of the US government,

2) Use workable FRZ airspace procedures that verify an approved pilot has control of their aircraft,

3) Let *Those Who Know Who They Are* expand the FRZ <u>temporarily</u>, to thirty miles or more, at their discretion, <u>but only under declared</u> <u>escalating conditions</u>,

4) Establish clear authority and responsibility during a real crisis,

5) All the while, allow preapproved legitimate users normal use within the FRZ as known friendlies, <u>as they are not a threat.</u>

'Nuff said. Sit back, enjoy the show.

David Wartofsky, Oct 11, 2005 Bigcheese@Potomac-Airfield

**P.S. AND OH, BY THE WAY** As I write this, I *may* have one hangar available: call 301 248 5720.

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