David Wartofsky
POTOMAC AIRFIELD
Before the 2nd FAA ADIZ Hearing – Jan 2006
The Good the Bad & the Ugly

• Is there a threat?
• If there is, what can we do about it?
• How can we make it work?

• What doesn’t work
IS THERE A THREAT FROM GENERAL AVIATION?

• **TSA’s Statement** before State Aviation Conference in Iowa September 2005 –
  - “Frankly, we just don’t see any General Aviation (GA) threat,”
  - “We are really just looking for a good story for Congress.”

• **Threat Analysis** (Senior DIA Analyst) - on [www.potomac-airfield.com](http://www.potomac-airfield.com) February 2002 -
  - “Ground vehicle is a better delivery platform than a light aircraft”
  - “Given their limitations as a vehicles of destruction, security risks from GA aircraft are negligible”

But **THERE STILL MIGHT BE A THREAT**…

Political Reality & Moral Obligation Require us to address the threat, however small
What can we do about it?  

Realistically
What REALLY stops a terrorist?

DESTRUCTION

AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSE
  USAF  AIR NATIONAL GUARD
  USCG  CUSTOMS

SURFACE TO AIR DEFENSE
  AIR-DEFENSE BATTERY

TO ANY REAL TERRORIST
NOTHING ELSE MATTERS
To be avoided at all costs

Missionary Family Shot Down in Peru – April 2001
“A Peruvian interceptor jet opened fire on a Cessna 185 floatplane. The American missionary Veronica Bowers and her seven month old baby daughter, Charity, were killed instantly as bullets tore through the fuselage.”
The Problem

ARMED DEFENDERS Cannot tell FRIEND from FOE

WHO IS WHO?
What we would like to see

A ‘MAGIC RADAR’
THAT CAN TELL FRIEND from FOE
Available Solutions

• **SOLUTION #1**: ‘Magic Radar’
  - BY SPECIAL PROCEDURES
    - Don’t worry about friendlies
    - Focus on unknown radar targets
    - Shoot ONLY targets KNOWN to be a threat
  = Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ)

• **SOLUTION #2**: Make everyone follow the same rules
  - Suspect everyone
  - Penalize anyone that makes a mistake
  = Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)

• **SOLUTION #3**: Restrict all movements
  - Suspect everyone
  - Shoot anyone that enters the area
  = PROHIBITED AREA (P56)

*NOT SUPPORTED BY ANYONE*
SOLUTION #1 - ‘MAGIC RADAR’

**FRZ DEFENDERS CAN TELL FRIEND FROM FOE**

- **FRIENDs** – Get ‘safe passage’ past real defenses
  - Pre-approved for **security clearance**
  - Approved pilots **authenticated & movements of no concern**

**ASSURES IN-COCKPIT CONTROL BY TRUSTED AGENT**

- **FOEs** – Face threat of destruction
  - **Cannot authenticate airspace clearance**
  - **Cannot obtain ‘safe passage’ past defenses**

**DEFENDED FRZ AIRSPACE REMAINS TOO DANGEROUS**
‘MAGIC RADAR’: FOCUS ON **UNKNOWN**

**REAL ATTACKER**
- MUST BE AIRBORNE AND
- MUST BE ATTACKING

**REAL DEFENDER**
WATCHES AIRSPACE
- AIRBORNE MOVEMENTS
- APPROACHING AREA

WITH OR WITHOUT A TRANSPOUNDER

REQUIRES FLYING **TOWARD** THEIR TARGET

APPROACHING defended area
‘MAGIC RADAR’ – PINPOINTS THREATS

**IDENTIFIED** – Trusted Agent in control of their aircraft
Do not worry about them, they are **NOT A THREAT**

**UNKNOWN** – Might be a threat, **MOST LIKELY JUST LOST** (>2,000+)

**CANNOT TELL** – **JUST HEAD THEM OFF**

Cooperation with air-traffic control
Chased off by air interdiction

**THREATS = Unidentified intruders**
Determined to Approach
Despite All Challenges
**THEN GO TO HIGH ALERT**
FLIGHT RESTRICTED ZONE (FRZ)  
= ‘MAGIC RADAR’

• Answers the question “WHO GOES THERE?”
  – Removes Friendlies as a concern
  – Makes unknown radar targets more obvious

• FRZ Airspace Boundary
  – Warns pilots not to enter area without authorization
  – Provides safety buffer around armed defenses

WORKING SINCE FEB ‘02
SOLUTION #2 – SAME RULES FOR EVERYONE
ADIZ DEFENDERS CANNOT TELL FRIEND FROM FOE

CURRENT ADIZ PROCEDURES
- Fill out FAA paperwork correctly
- Keep FAA documents current
- File flight-plan (No authentication)
- Follow PUBLIC procedures

ALL ADIZ RADAR TARGETS REMAIN ‘UNKNOWN’
Identity? Intent?

FRIEND & FOE FOLLOW THE SAME PUBLIC RULES
HIGH ADIZ WORKLOAD - NO REAL SECURITY BENEFIT
‘MAGIC RADAR’
ENHANCES SECURITY
RESTORES NEEDED ACCESS

BUT....
A **CONTINUOUS** 30 MILE FRZ
WOULD BE ECONOMICALLY CATASTROPHIC
POP-OUT THE ‘MAGIC RADAR’ WHEN NEEDED

- Replace current ‘ADIZ’ with National Security Airspace (NSA)
- Make it EASY TO AVOID by making it a CIRCLE
- EXPAND to PREDICTABLE boundary during an EMERGENCY
- All Pilots welcome to apply for clearance, in case area expands
- Pilot approvals COULD BE USED for passage through other areas of concern

FRZ only expands during DECLARED emergencies
NOT CASUALLY NOT PERMANENTLY

- WHEN NO EMERGENCY
GOOD GUYS COME AND GO NORMALLY

- WHEN EMERGENCY DECLARED
GOOD GUYS COME AND GO NORMALLY
BAD GUYS DARE NOT COME OR GO

A REAL SOLUTION: EFFECTIVE & SUSTAINABLE
WHO DECIDES?

Who Decides the Emergency?

- **Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD 62)**
  - USSS was made ‘Lead Agency’ in ‘NSSE’ & ‘NCA’
  - USSS knowledgeable of THREAT
  - Means for Executive Office to exercise emergency Executive Authority *if necessary*
  - Similar policy continues…

  **THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE DECLARES THE EMERGENCY**

Who Should Lead in Determining FRIEND or FOE?

- **Make CUSTOMS the ‘Executive Agent’ for US SECRET SERVICE CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL (CBP)**
  - Already coordinates RADAR and PILOT information
  - Has already operational assets – Airborne Tracking & Interdiction
  - Has access to relevant intelligence
    - CBP KNOWS THE FRIENDLIES
    - CBP KNOWS WHEN NOT TO SHOOT
    - CBP KNOWS WHAT REALLY COUNTS
    - CBP HAS BEEN DOING IT FOR DECADES AROUND ALL US BORDERS

  **CUSTOMS DECIDES WHEN NOT TO SHOOT**
EXPLODING THE MYTHS

• What was the basis for the 15 Mile FRZ?
  – Built on False Assumptions
  – Used to ‘buy down’ 25 mile ‘Temporary Flight Restriction’ around Washington DC (TFR)
  – Offered as a Political compromise
  – Tolerated for Reasons of Preparedness
  – Prototype for Emergency Airspace

• Where did the ADIZ come from?
  – Moment of historical hysteria
  – Nothing more than a false half-move forward
  – A move that stunned the security agencies

SECURITY AGENCIES WERE EXPECTING A POP-OUT FRZ
WHAT DOESN’T WORK
THE ADIZ FAILS

• ADIZ procedures
  – ONLY assures everybody follows the SAME RULES
  – CANNOT tell apart FRIEND from FOE
  – CANNOT AUTHENTICATE Pilots
  – CANNOT assure IN-COCKPIT CONTROL
‘AIRPORT SECURITY’ FAILS
ONLY legitimate pilots following rules are constrained by ground security

‘Ground Security’
‘Control Point’
Mon-Fri 8A-6P

ANY REAL THREAT REMAINS FREE TO COME AND GO AT WILL

HOSTILE INBOUND FLIGHT OVERHEAD

24/7

24/7

24/7
‘Airport Security? Where?’

- Terrorists using an aircraft can takeoff

From **ANYWHERE**
At **ANYTIME**

**PREDICTABLE SECURITY**
**AT A FEW SPECIFIC LOCATIONS**
**IS INEFFECTIVE**
WHERE CAN AIR ATTACK COME FROM?

ANSWER: FROM ANYWHERE
What Should Be Done

- MOVE TO MORE EFFECTIVE AIRSPACE PROTOCOLS (POP-OUT FRZ)
- MOVE AWAY FROM INEFFECTIVE GROUND SECURITY
  - Stop doing things that don’t work
    - Security at a few airports during limited hours
    - Filing flight plans without authentication
    - Tagging radar targets with no objective
    - Penalizing the innocent for Government induced confusion
- GIVE ONE AGENCY THE LEAD to IDENTIFY FRIEND from FOE
  - DON’T SHOOT THE INNOCENT
Government Agencies Politically COMPELLED To Keep Doing ‘Something More’

Until Specifically Told Otherwise

‘By the People’

**Through Due Process**
- Rulemaking
- Public Oversight
- Public Accountability

**Through Elected Officials**
- US Congress
- Specific Legislation
- Executive Office
- White House Directive
Missionary Family Shot Down in Peru

A CIA surveillance plane alerted the Peruvian air force to the presence of the Cessna, “…Which they believed to be flying without a flight plan.”

The Cessna pilot had been in contact with the tower and been given a landing slot “…How could he be in contact with the civil authorities and their military not know?”

The high-speed intercepting jet made efforts to communicate with the Cessna “…As there was no response, the interceptor opened fire”

“To shoot down a plane is to condemn its occupants to death without giving them the benefit of the doubt.”

“To shoot down civilian planes is the equivalent to an extra-judicial execution”

The Peruvian air force has promised to investigate and "deeply regretted" the loss of life.
SECURITY

PRICELESS?
THANK YOU

David Wartofsky
bigcheese@potomac-airfield.com

www.POTOMAC-AIRFIELD.com